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Sammendrag 
Tidligere studier har vist at det er en positiv korrelasjon mellom kvinners lønnsinntekt og 
sannsynligheten for å få barn når familiepolitiske ordninger og/eller et aktivt farskap gjør det 
mulig å kombinere yrkesliv og familie. Menns fruktbarhetsatferd er gjennomgående mindre 
studert enn kvinners, og betydningen av kontekst for sammenhengen mellom menns 
lønnsinntekt og fruktbarhetsatferd er ikke tidligere undersøkt.  
 
Denne studien undersøker hvordan sammenhengen mellom lønnsinntekt og 
førstefødselssannsynlighet endrer seg for norske menn og kvinner i perioden 1994-2008. I 
denne perioden har mødre økt sitt arbeidstilbud, samtidig med at fedre har økt sin innsats på 
hjemmebane. Økt tilgang på barnehageplasser har også gjort det lettere å kombinere 
lønnsarbeid og familie. Til sammen fører dette til en forventning om at sammenhengen 
mellom lønnsinntekt og fruktbarhet skal ha blitt mer positiv over tid for kvinner - og mindre 
positiv over tid for men.  
 
Jeg estimerer korrelasjonen mellom årlig lønnsinntekt og førstefødselssannsynlighet i neste 
kalenderår ved hjelp av diskret tids hasardregresjon. Data for menn og kvinner som er født i 
perioden 1955-1988 som var under risiko for å få et første barn i perioden 1994-2008 er 
hentet fra norske administrative registere. Jeg kontrollerer for en rekke potensielt viktige 
bakenforliggende variable: Utdanningsnivå, studentstatus, alder, periode, fødested, helse, 
aggregert arbeidsledighet og mottak av arbeidsledighetstrygd.  
 
Resultatene viser at korrelasjonen mellom lønnsinntekt og fruktbarhet blir mer positiv over tid 
for kvinner, men er uendret for menn. Resultatene gir dermed ikke støtte for at et mer 
involvert farskap gjør det mindre viktig for menn å ha høy inntekt før de får barn. At 
korrelasjonen blir mer positiv over tid for kvinner kan skyldes at det har blitt enklere å 
kombinere foreldreskap og yrkesliv - og at kvinner i større grad enn før foretrekker å etablere 
et fotfeste i arbeidslivet før de får barn. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The relationship between female earnings and fertility is context dependent. Cross-country 
comparisons indicate that in contexts with weak institutional support for families and/or 
gender traditional division of labour in the family, a conflict between employment and 
childbearing leads to a negative relationship between earnings and fertility for women. As the 
institutional support for families increase and/or the division of labour in the family becomes 
more gender equal, employment facilitates the transition to motherhood for women, and a 
positive correlation between female earnings and fertility emerges (Berninger 2013, 
Andersson, Kreyenfeld & Mika 2009, Matysiak 2011). The fact that employment comes to 
facilitate the transition to motherhood is among the main explanations suggested for the shift 
to a positive correlation between human development and fertility found in macro-level 
analysis (Myrskylä, Kohler & Billari 2009, Luci-Greulich & Thévenon 2014). However, no 
previous study has used micro-level data to assess how the correlation between earnings and 
fertility responds to changes over time in gender relations and the institutions surrounding the 
family.  
 
As common in fertility research, women have been the focal persons in studies of earnings 
and fertility (Goldscheider & Kaufman 1996). Knowledge of how context shapes the 
relationship between men’s earnings and fertility is therefore limited. Over the last few 
decades, the time fathers spend with their young children has increased substantially, 
particularly in the Nordic countries (Hook 2006, Kitterød & Rønsen 2013, Dribe & Stanfors 
2009). As men spend an increasing amount of time on childrearing, a conflict between 
fathering and career development may emerge, potentially inducing some high-earning men 
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to forgo fatherhood. If so, the correlation between men’s earnings and fertility is expected to 
become less positive over time.  
 
Norway constitutes a prime example of convergence of gender roles in the family and 
workplace. Since the 1980s, mothers have increased their efforts in paid work, while fathers 
have increasingly participated in household work (Kitterød & Rønsen 2013). As these 
changes play out, the relationship between earnings and fertility may be affected: Previous 
comparative studies lead to the expectation that the relationship between female earnings and 
fertility will become increasingly positive as women’s opportunity cost decreases, while the 
relationship between male earnings and fertility becomes less positive due to the increasing 
opportunity cost of childbearing for men.  
 
Using data from Norwegian administrative registers, I study how the correlation between 
lagged annual earnings and first birth probability changes in the period 1994-2008. The study 
is based on highly accurate register information on the annual earnings and first births of all 
Norwegian men and women born 1955-1988 who were at risk of a first birth in the period 
1994-2008 (N~ 11 million person years). I estimate the correlation between earned income 
and the yearly probability to enter parenthood using discrete time hazard regression. The 
extraordinarily rich data set allows for describing changes over time separately by sex through 
estimation of separate models by year and sex.  
 
As expected, the results for women confirm that when motherhood and employment becomes 
increasingly compatible, the correlation between earnings and the transition to motherhood 
becomes more positive.  For men, there are no substantial changes in the strength of the 
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correlation between earnings and fertility over time. This is a slightly surprising finding in 
light of the substantial increase in fathers’ involvement, expected to increase the substitution 
effect among men and make the correlation between earnings and fertility less positive. The 
results indicate that while the relationship between earnings and fertility is sensitive to 
contextual changes among women, this is not so – or at least less so – among men.  
2. Theoretical perspectives on earnings and the transition to 
parenthood 
 
The correlation between earnings and fertility is driven by two main mechanisms: His and her 
current earnings may affect a couple’s fertility decisions, and earnings may affect the 
propensity to enter and dissolve unions.  This section first outlines a theoretical framework for 
the impact of earnings on couples’ fertility decisions, taking rational choice theory (i.e. the 
microeconomic theory of fertility) as a starting point. I extend upon previous research by 
explicitly addressing rational choice theories of fertility timing. While rational choice theories 
typically are developed under the assumption of gender specialisation, I pay particular 
attention to the relevance of these theories in contexts where gender specialisation is at most 
partial (Kitterød & Rønsen 2013). Finally, I briefly discuss how union entry and stability 
could mediate the impact of earnings on fertility.  
2.1 A rational choice perspective on couples’ fertility choices 
 
Rational choice theories of fertility quantum address how the decision to have children is 
affected by (expected) lifetime earnings (Becker 1991). As the cost of taking time off work to 
care for children (opportunity cost) increases with lifetime earnings, the negative substitution 
effect is stronger when life time earnings are high. However, household income and thus the 
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ability to cover monetary costs of childrearing also increases in earnings, making for a 
positive income effect of life time earnings on fertility. If the substitution effect dominates the 
income effect, high-earning individuals will on average have fewer children than low-earning 
individuals. In a society where women do most of the unpaid work, the substitution effect will 
be weak for men, and high-earning men are expected to have more children than low-earning 
men due to the income effect
1
.  However, the amount of resources spent on each child is 
expected to increase with income, weakening the positive relationship between income and 
fertility among men (Becker 1991). 
 
Theories of fertility timing address when in the life course couples choose to have children. A 
key idea in theories of fertility timing is that, all else equal, it would be optimal to postpone 
the transition to parenthood to the end of the fecund years, when earnings are highest
2
 
(Happel, Hill & Low 1984; Hotz, Klerman, J. A. & Willis 1997, see also Polachek 2008:192 
for a description of earnings development over age). Consumption smoothing motivates this 
postponement: When fertility is postponed until earnings are high, couples can spend money 
on childrearing without reducing other consumption to a very low level
3
. This leads to the 
expectation that individuals with high current earnings will be more likely to enter 
parenthood, as their utility loss from consumption reduction is relatively low. In line with the 
expectations from this theory, a qualitative study of economic security and childbearing in 
Norway indicates that couples prefer to postpone childbearing until earnings are relatively 
                                                 
1 This holds as long as children are «normal goods», that is, goods for which demand increases in income.  
2 This restriction applies if one can not borrow freely against the future. 
3 The utility loss from consumption reduction decreases with income level (given decreasing marginal returns of 
consumption). 
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high in order to maintain a relatively high living standard after children are born (Ellingsæter 
& Pedersen 2013).   
 
Fertility timing decisions may also aim to minimize the negative effect of childbearing on 
earnings both in the short and the long term (Gustavsson 2001). Short-term effects of 
childbearing on earnings are driven by the fact that (at least one of the) parents usually 
withdraws from the labour market for a short period to care for infants (and to some extent for 
toddlers). The immediate cost of such labour market withdrawal increases with wages, 
making for a negative correlation between earnings and the probability to enter parenthood. 
However, this immediate cost may to a large extent be compensated by family policies: 
Parental allowance schemes with full income replacement allow a parent to stay home with a 
child for a certain period of time (almost) without any (immediate) monetary costs, and 
availability of subsidized high-quality child care for toddlers contributes to speed up the 
return to work after that period. If both of these arrangements are in place, the immediate 
monetary cost due to temporary job interruptions will be (close to) zero, and considerations 
regarding the long-term effects of childbearing on wages may be given more weight in 
fertility decisions. 
 
The long-term negative effects of childbearing on wage development is commonly explained 
by the fact that childbearing hinders new investment in human capital – and/or reduces the 
value of human capital already accumulated (Even 1987). Empirical studies indicate that 
postponing motherhood until a level of career maturity is reached reduces the total wage 
penalty of motherhood (Buckles 2008, Wilde, Batchelder & Ellwod 2010, Miller 2011, 
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Taniguchi 1999)
4
. On a similar note, Matysiak (2011) finds that Polish women prefer to 
establish a foothold in the labour market before they have a first child. In sum, to the extent 
that higher earnings indicate career maturity, attempts to minimize long-term wage penalties 
may contribute to a positive correlation between earnings and first birth probability. This 
corresponds to the more sociological notion that men and women prefer an ordering of life 
course transitions where a foothold in the labour market is established before the first child is 
born.  
 
The relationship between current earnings and first birth risk is further complicated by the fact 
that the wage penalty for early childbearing may increase with expected lifetime earnings. 
Qualitative evidence from Norway supports the notion that more career oriented women are 
more inclined toward postponing fertility until they have accumulated work experience than 
are women who are less career oriented (Ellingsæter & Pedersen 2013). Possibly, women on 
high-earning tracks, employed in “career jobs”, face relatively larger wage penalties for early 
childbearing.  If the penalty for early childbearing is largest for women with high life time 
earnings, women with high current earnings may be more likely to postpone parenthood than 
women with lower earnings. Such heterogenous postponement would make the correlation 
between earnings and fertility more negative. This stands in contrast to uniform postponement 
– as outlined in the previous paragraph – which would contribute to a positive correlation 
between earnings and fertility.   
 
                                                 
4 Different theoretical mechanisms could explain such a postponement premium. One possible explanation is that 
motherhood implies a long-term wage growth penalty – a penalty that would be smallest relatively late in the career when the 
wage would not increase much anyway (Gustavsson 2001).  Another explanation is that uninterrupted career investments up 
to a given point of time give long-term rewards (Buckles 2008:404). 
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In the above, I have outlined two possible drivers of a positive correlation between earnings 
and first birth probability: Higher earnings means that it is less straining to reduce 
consumption of other goods upon the birth of a child, and may also indicate that a foothold is 
established in the labour market, which may in turn reduce the long-term wage penalty of 
childbearing. Two mechanisms pull in the opposite direction, making the correlation between 
earnings and fertility more negative. As the opportunity cost of childbearing increases with 
earnings, some high-earning individuals may prefer not to have a child. Additionally, to the 
extent that individuals with high earnings over the life course have a preference for delayed 
childbearing, this will also contribute to a less positive correlation between earnings and first 
birth probability.  
 
In the Nordic context, the mechanisms driving a positive correlation between earnings and 
fertility dominate mechanisms pulling in the opposite direction, as the correlation between 
annual earnings and the probability to enter motherhood is consistently found to be positive 
(Andersson 2000 (Sweden), Vikat 2004, Berninger 2013, Jalovaara & Miettinen 2013 
(Finland), Andersson et al 2009 (Denmark), Kravdal 1994 (Norway)).  However, it should be 
noted that studies using predicted wages rather than observed earnings have found significant 
negative effects for Norway: Rønsen (2004) finds an overall negative effect, and Kornstad 
and Rønsen (2014) find significant negative effects of wages at the average level or lower. 
For men, Lappegård & Rønsen (2013) and Jalovaara & Miettinen (2013) find positive 
correlation between annual earnings and the transition to parenthood, while some older 
Swedish studies find an insignificant (Heckman & Walker 1990) or even, in some 
specifications negative effects (Tasiran 1994).  
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2.2 Union entry and stability as a mediator 
Intending to have a child in the near future may serve as a motivation to marry or enter a 
consensual union (Rindfuss & St. John 1983), and living with a partner may strengthen the 
desire to have a child – particularly among men (Marsigilio 2007). Selecting the sample on 
union status implies conditioning on an endogenous variable, which could both net out part of 
the total impact of earnings on fertility and introduce further selection bias in the model 
(Winship & Elwert 2014). The following section outlines theoretical perspectives on the role 
of union entry and stability as a mediator of the earnings-fertility relationship.  
 
Earnings are important for union entry partly because the spouses cover the costs of 
childbearing and various other expenses together: A high-earning partner can contribute more 
to the (monetary) cost of childbearing, giving a higher overall material living standard. While 
the theory of gender specialisation (Becker 1991) predicts that only women prefer a high-
earning partner, the theory of pooling of resources (Oppenheimer 1997, 2003) suggests that 
this preference holds across sexes.  In the Nordic context, empirical studies show a positive 
impact of earnings on union entry for both men (Sweeney 2002, Petersen, Penner & Høgsnes 
2011) and women (Bracher & Santow 1998, Jalovaara 2012), overall lending support to the 
theory of pooling of resources. The results for union dissolution are more mixed: A similar 
earnings level between cohabiting spouses is correlated with reduced  risk of union 
dissolution (Kalmijn, Loeve & Manting 2007, Brines and Joyner 1999, Jalovaara 2013), while 
his higher earnings protect against divorce and her higher earnings elevates the divorce risk 
(Lyngstad (2004) for Norway, Jalovaara (2003) for Finland).  In sum, higher earnings are 
expected to facilitate union entry and stability across sex – though slightly more for men than 
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for women – contributing to a positive correlation between earnings and the transition to 
parenthood.  
3. Theoretical perspectives on change over time  
 
In the period of study, there has been a marked increase in the time fathers spend on 
childrearing (Kitterød & Rønsen 2013). Particularly, the introduction of the daddy quota 
means that the birth of a child now implies a short career break for men. More involved 
fathering is accompanied by a small fatherhood wage penalty among men in the private sector 
(Cools & Strøm 2014), indicating that the substitution effect has become stronger for men. 
This could induce some high-earning men to not enter parenthood – a development that would 
make the correlation between earnings and fertility less positive for men.  
 
Some trends indicate that the long-term negative effects of childbearing on women’s lifetime 
earnings may have decreased over time:  The combination of a slight decrease in the time 
mothers of small children spend on care work and an observed increase in mothers’ labour 
supply (Kitterød & Rønsen 2013) indicates that mothers to some extent have shifted their 
efforts from home production to market production in the period of study. There is evidence 
that mothers return increasingly fast to work after childbirth from towards the end of the 
period of study – indicating that the human capital loss caused by the birth of a child 
decreases over time (Rønsen & Kitterød 2014).  One plausible explanation for the increase in 
mothers’ labour supply is the massive expansion of available publicly subsidized childcare 
slots in the period of study, a development also shown to increase fertility among women 
whose opportunity costs of childbearing are high (Rindfuss, Guilkey, Morgan & Kravdal 
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2010). In sum, these developments lower the opportunity cost of childbearing, which may 
induce some high-earning women who would otherwise have remained childless to have a 
first child, making the correlation between women’s earnings and chance of first birth more 
positive.  
 
Finally, there are some indications that the monetary cost of childbearing has increased in the 
period of study. The value of cash transfers to parents has declined relative to real earnings, 
effectively increasing the monetary cost of childrearing
5
. Some studies also indicate that 
spending on children has increased (Kornrich & Furstenberg 2013). In the Norwegian context, 
characterized by strong norms toward home ownership and high real estate prices, housing 
costs make up a substantial amount of the monetary cost of childbearing. The almost linear 
increase in housing prices in the period of study
6
  has thus likely raised the monetary costs of 
childbearing.  
 
If the monetary cost of childbearing increases, individuals may increasingly prefer to have a 
child at a time point when earnings are high. This development may also imply that women 
with higher earnings potential are increasingly attractive as partners, making the correlation 
between earnings and fertility more positive for women especially (see Oppenheimer (1997) 
for a discussion of this). In sum, both changing gender relations as well as the increasing 
                                                 
5
 Child allowances (not means tested) are given from the first child. In the early 1990s, child allowances made a substantial 
contribution to covering the monetary cost of childbearing. Since then, the absolute value of child allowances has remained 
virtually unchanged. After adjustment for price growth, the purchasing value of the child allowances has actually declined in 
the period of study. Mothers who have not earned rights to parental leave allowance receive a lump-sum transfer upon birth 
(“engangsstønad”). After a marked increase in the early 1990s, the nominal value of this lump-sum transfer has again been 
virtually unchanged through the period, leaving its CPI-adjusted value to decrease in the period of study (Ministry of 
Children and Family Affairs 1996 and 2004, Ministry of Finance 2009).  
 
6 http://www.ssb.no/en/statistikkbanken, Table 07230, House price index, whole country (1993-2007).  
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monetary cost of children are expected to make the correlation between earnings and fertility 
increasingly positive for women over time. For men, new fathering practices likely makes for 
a less positive correlation between earnings and fertility, while the increasing monetary costs 
of childrearing pulls the correlation in the opposite direction. Whether one of these 
mechanisms dominates the other – or the two mechanisms cancel each other out – thus 
remains an empirical question.  
4. Method and data 
4.1 Data 
The analysis is based on data on births, earnings, unemployment benefits, health related 
benefits, and educational level/enrolment for all men and women born 1955-1987 from the 
Norwegian population registers. The data set further is restricted to persons who have at least 
one Norwegian-born parent, who are Norwegian citizens, and who did not have a first child 
either before age 20 or before year 1994. First births are observed in the period 1994-2008, 
and observations are censored at whatever occurs first of a first birth, age 50 or calendar year 
2008.  
4.2 Method 
Discrete-time hazard regression models for first birth rates are estimated with the baseline rate 
(hazard) specified as a linear spline with 5-year knots. After data are transformed into person 
years, logistic regression models are estimated in Stata, using the logit command. To allow 
for comparison of the magnitude of regression coefficients across different samples, results 
are displayed as average marginal effects (obtained by the Stata command margins) (Mood 
2010).  When presented as average marginal effects, coefficients give the average absolute 
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change in first birth probability in the study sample associated with a one-unit change in the 
explanatory variables.  
4.3 Variables 
The earnings variable is based on the sum of earnings from employment and primary and 
secondary business income. The two latter sources of income are included as they convey 
information of the individual’s earnings potential that is not captured when using information 
on earnings from employment alone. Earnings quintiles are calculated based on the position in 
the earnings distribution relative to all individuals (i.e. both parents and (currently) childless 
persons) of the same sex and age in the same year. Calculations are done separately by year 
and age to avoid that the earnings variable captures period and age effects. Missing earnings 
are included as a separate category.  
 
Potential confounders are included in the empirical model to net out spurious elements of the 
association between earnings and first birth probability. Being enrolled in full-time education 
reduces earned income (as less time is allocated to paid work), and also reduces the 
probability of having a child for reasons unrelated to earnings. To capture full-time education 
rather than participation in shorter courses, educational enrolment is defined as enrolment for 
at least 4 months of the previous year. Educational attainment also affects earnings as well as 
fertility decisions (see e.g. Lappegård & Rønsen 2005, Kravdal & Rindfuss 2008), and is 
therefore included in the model.  Unemployment may affect fertility through reducing 
income, but also through creating uncertainty about future economic prospects (see e.g. 
Kreyenfeld 2010). To avoid that such effects of unemployment are captured by the earnings 
estimates, a control for reception of unemployment benefits is included. A dummy for receipt 
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of disability pension or rehabilitation transfers was constructed to capture health limitations 
that affect earnings potential
7
 as such health limitations may affect childbearing desires 
through channels other than reduced earnings. As fertility and earnings level both change over 
time, period is a potential confounder. This is handled either through including a set of 
dummy variables for period as controls (Model 1) or by running regressions separately by 
calendar year (Model 2). Finally, a set of dummies for region of birth
8
 is included, to capture 
regional variation in earnings level and fertility that may confound the estimates for earnings. 
 
A couple’s decision to get married may result from an intention to have a first child, and if so, 
a control for marital status would be a control for an intention to have a child (see Rindfuss & 
St. John (1983) for a discussion of this). Including marital status in the model would then 
control out any indirect effect of earnings potential on fertility that is mediated by marriage. 
For this reason, controls for marital status are omitted. A covariate for marital status would 
also make comparisons over time less clear due to the increase in first births to cohabitants: 
Non-marital births in the first part of the period will to a larger extent be births to single 
mothers in the beginning of the study, while a larger proportion of non-martial births in the 
end of the period of study will be to cohabiting mothers (Noack 2010:30). 
 
  
                                                 
7 The health dummy is based on a measure from FD Trygd, which includes old age pensions as well as child allowances. 
However, as childless persons under age 50 do not have the right to neither of these additional benefits the measure 
constitutes a fairly good proxy for reception of health benefits in this group. “Sykepenger”, which is given for the first year of 
sickness absence, is included in the earnings variable.  
8 Measuered at the county level (“fylke”).  
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5. Results  
 
Summary statistics of person years are shown in Table 1. The study sample consists of 
6 563 808 person years for men and 4 822 906 person years for women, with 332 782 and 
331 346 events (first births) respectively. This amounts to a mean yearly probability of first 
birth of 5 per cent among men, and close to 7 per cent among women.  In a relatively large 
per cent of the person years (32.2% among men and 42.4% among women) the individual was 
enrolled in education for at least four months. Men are more likely than women to have re-
ceived unemployment benefits in any given year (12.2 per cent for men versus 7.2 per cent for 
women). 
 
Because earnings quintile is calculated based on the position in the earnings distribution rela-
tive to all persons of the same sex and age – not just the (still) childless individuals in the 
study sample – the earnings quintile groups in the study sample are of uneven size. It should 
be noted that while individuals with zero earnings are included in the calculation of earnings 
quintiles (and all grouped into the first earnings quintile); individuals for whom information 
on earnings is not available are not. Information on earnings is lacking for 12.5 per cent of the 
person years in the male sample and 16.5 per cent of the female sample. A simple cross tabu-
lation (Appendix, Table A1) shows that the proportion with missing earnings is relatively 
evenly distributed over period, and thus unlikely to affect results regarding period changes. 
The same holds for the proportion with zero earnings, which revolves around 7.7 and 6.7 per 
cent in the male and female sample respectively (Appendix, Table A1).  
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Table 1: Summary statistics – person years 
 MEN  WOMEN 
 Freq. % Freq. % 
First birth in current year     
No 6 229 026 94,9 % 4 491 560 93,1 % 
Yes  334 782 5,1 % 331 346 6,9 % 
Educational attainment      
Higher education, higher degree 310 834 4,7 % 207 734 4,3 % 
Higher education, lower degree 1 105 607 16,8 % 1 300 927 27,0 % 
Primary education  893 272 13,6 % 615 315 12,8 % 
Secondary education  4 200 367 64,0 % 2 663 188 55,2 % 
Missing 53 728 0,8 % 35 742 0,7 % 
Educational enrolment      
No  4 450 218 67,8 % 2 779 709 57,6 % 
Yes  2 113 590 32,2 % 2 043 197 42,4 % 
Received unemployment benefits      
No  5 762 584 87,8 % 4 475 252 92,8 % 
Yes  801 224 12,2 % 347 654 7,2 % 
Received health-related benefits      
No  6 130 042 93,4 % 4 505 919 93,4 % 
Yes 433 766 6,6 % 316 987 6,6 % 
Period      
1994-1997 1 674 299 25,5 % 1 232 483 25,6 % 
1998-2001 1 734 386 26,4 % 1 274 224 26,4 % 
2001-2005 1 796 065 27,4 % 1 318 274 27,3 % 
2006-2008 1 359 058 20,7 % 997 925 20,7 % 
Earnings quintile      
Missing  821 596 12,5 % 794 181 16,5 % 
Q1 1 386 014 21,1 % 665 938 13,8 % 
Q2 1 194 055 18,2 % 691 235 14,3 % 
Q3 1 080 266 16,5 % 683 911 14,2 % 
Q4 1 043 059 15,9 % 855 284 17,7 % 
Q5 1 038 818 15,8 % 1 132 357 23,5 % 
 Mean SE Mean SE 
Log (earnings/10 000) 2,576 0,002 2,059 0,002 
Age 29,239 0,003 28,277 0,003 
N 6 563 808 4 822 906 
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Figure 1: Mean CPI-adjusted earnings by earnings quintile, period and year   
 
Note: The figure is based on information on earnings from employment as well as primary and secondary business income 
for men and women born 1955-1987 and aged 20-50 years from the Norwegian population registers. The sample is limited to 
men and women born 1955-1987 who is between age 20 and 50 years in the given year, and to persons who have at least one 
Norwegian-born parent and are Norwegian citizen. Individuals with missing earnings are excluded, while individuals with 
zero earnings are included in the lowest (first) earnings quintile.  
 
 
Figure 1 provides more detailed information of the distribution of the main explanatory 
variable in the study sample. Mean CPI-adjusted earnings are plotted over period, separately 
by sex and earnings quintile.  The figure shows that mean earnings increases over period in all 
parts of the earnings distribution, but the absolute increase is highest in the highest earnings 
quintile. Thus, both purchasing power and earnings inequality increase over time
9
. This 
development stands in contrast to the stable or declining value of cash transfers through the 
                                                 
9  Due to the sample selection criteria, the mean age increases over period (with 2.2 and 3.1 years among men and women 
respectivelty). This in turn contributes to an increase in mean earnings over period. However, a simple OLS regression of log 
earnings on dummies for period and age reveals that changes in the age composition explains very little of the change in 
earnings level over period.  
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period of study (as described in Section 3). As the value of earnings and earnings-based 
benefits (such as parental leave allowance) increases relative to the value of cash transfers, 
earned income could become increasingly important for the transition to parenthood.   
 
5.1 Results from main specification  
Parameter estimates from a discrete time hazard regression of the probability of a first birth, 
estimated for the full study sample (Model 1), are shown in Table 2. Coefficients are 
displayed as average marginal effects, giving the mean absolute increase in the probability of 
first birth associated with a one unit increase in the dependent variable.  
 
For men (Model 1a), the coefficients show that the mean yearly first birth probability 
increases monotonously with earnings: The highest first birth probability is found in the fifth 
(highest) earnings quintile, and the lowest first birth probability is found in the first (lowest) 
earnings quintile (reference category). Men for whom no data on earnings are available 
(missing category) display the by far lowest probability of a first birth. When moving from 
the first to the fifth earnings category, the probability of having a first birth increases by 0.04. 
Bearing in mind that the average first birth probability is 0.05 among men (Table 1), the 
estimates show that the correlation between earnings level and first birth probability is 
substantial.  
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Table 2: Model 1. Discrete time hazard regression of the (conditional) yearly probability 
to have a first child. Average marginal effects.  95% confidence intervals in brackets  
Earnings quintile  A) MEN  B) WOMEN  
(ref=Q1)   
Q2 0.0168*** -0.00370*** 
 [0.0161,0.0174] [-0.00476,-0.00264] 
Q3 0.0298*** 0.0145*** 
 [0.0291,0.0304] [0.0135,0.0155] 
Q4 0.0374*** 0.0334*** 
 [0.0368,0.0380] [0.0324,0.0343] 
Q5 0.0420*** 0.0374*** 
 [0.0414,0.0427] [0.0364,0.0383] 
Missing  -0.0308*** -0.0264*** 
 [-0.0320, -0.0295] [-0.0277, -0.0250] 
Educational attainment   
(ref=secondary education)   
Higher education, higher degree  0.00687*** 0.0108*** 
 [0.00623,0.00751] [0.00985,0.0118] 
Higher education, lower degree  0.00292*** 0.00536*** 
 [0.00248,0.00336] [0.00482,0.00591] 
Primary education  -0.00222*** -0.00530*** 
 [-0.00289,-0.00154] [-0.00636,-0.00425] 
Missing  0.00377*** 0.0298*** 
 [0.00184,0.00571] [0.0275,0.0321] 
Educational enrolment    
(ref=no)   
Yes -0.0118*** -0.0340*** 
 [-0.0123,-0.0113] [-0.0346,-0.0334] 
Received unemployment benefits    
(ref=no)   
Yes 0.00207*** 0.0113*** 
 [0.00154,0.00259] [0.0106,0.0121] 
Received health benefits   
(ref=no) -0.0242*** -0.0218*** 
Yes  [-0.0253,-0.0232] [-0.0232,-0.0205] 
   
Log aggregate unemployment rate 0.000231 0.0000747 
 [-0.000579,0.00104] [-0.00127,0.00142] 
N 6563808 4822906 
Note: The baseline hazard (i.e. age) is specified as a linear spline with 5-year knots. The model includes dummies for periods 
and region of birth. Sample includes all Norwegian men and women born 1955-1988 who were at risk of having a first child 
in the period 1994-2009.  Individuals are observed from age 20 to (what occurs first of) a first birth, age 50 or year 2008. 
*** p<0.001, ** p <0.01, *p<0.1  
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For women, the coefficients reveal a non-monotonous relationship between earnings quintile 
and first birth probability: Compared to the lowest quintile (reference category), women in the 
second quintile have slightly lower probability of having a first child. With this exception, the 
first birth probability increases monotonously in earnings. The proportion having a first child 
in a given year is 0.03 higher in the fifth earnings quintile than in the lowest. The coefficients 
are, however, consistently less positive for women than for men, and non-overlapping 95 per 
cent confidence intervals indicate that the differences by sex are significant on the 0.05 per 
cent level.   
 
The directions of the parameter estimates of the control variables are largely as expected. 
Reception of unemployment benefits the previous year is positively correlated with first birth 
probability among women as well as men, indicating that unemployment (conditional on 
earnings) lowers the time cost of childbearing and thus increasing fertility across sex. The 
estimates for reception of health benefits is negative across sexes, indicating that health 
problems leads to postponement of fertility for women as well as men. It is noteworthy that 
the estimates change little, and rarely significantly, when the control variables are added 
consecutively (not shown). With the exception of yearly national unemployment rate (for 
which there is no variation within year), all control variables are included when the model is 
estimated upon separately by year. The control variables display the same overall pattern in 
the year-specific model, but for the sake of brevity the estimates are neither shown nor 
commented upon (available on request).  
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5.2 Changes over time 
Figure 2A: Results from hazard regressions of earnings quintile on yearly first birth 
probability. Separate models by period, men. Average marginal effects  
 
 
Note: For each year, the study sample consists of women born between 1955-1988 and aged 20-50 years, who are childless 
at the start of the year. All models include controls for educational attainment and enrolment, reception of unemployment 
benefits in the previous year, reception of health benefits in the previous year, and dummies for region of births. All explana-
tory variables are lagged with one year.  
 
In Section 3, I argued that the correlation between earnings and fertility is expected to become 
increasingly similar across sex over period – either because the correlation becomes more 
positive for women and/or because the correlation becomes less positive for men. In this 
section, I test the hypothesis of change over (period) time by estimating Model 1a and b 
separately by period, allowing the effect period and sex and all other independent variables to 
vary by year. Results from 15 separate period regressions are shown in Figure 2a (men) and 
2b (women). A table with all year-specific estimates and 95 per cent confidence intervals is 
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found in the Appendix (Table A2 and A3). Again, estimates are presented as average 
marginal effects to facilitate comparison across models.  
 
For men, the correlation between earnings quintile and first birth probability is stable 
throughout the observation period. In all years in the period 1994-2008, the probability of 
having a first child increases monotonously with earnings quintile. The magnitude of the 
estimates indicate a non-linear relationship between annual earnings and fertility: While first 
birth probability increases markedly from the first to the second quintile, the differences 
between the estimates for the fourth and the fifth earnings quintiles are small, and their 95 per 
cent confidence intervals are often overlapping.  
 
 
For women (Figure 2b), the parameter estimates display a small yet marked change over 
period. In the beginning of the period, the relationship between earnings and fertility is not 
monotonously positive: Among women with recorded earnings, the lowest first birth 
probability is found in the second quintile, and the first birth probability in the third earnings 
quintile does not differ significantly from that in the first (reference category). However, 
women in the fourth and fifth earnings quintile display the highest first birth probability 
throughout the period of study. Though the highest first birth probability is usually found in 
the fifth earnings quintile, the estimates for the two highest earnings quintiles are of similar 
magnitude and their 95 per cent confidence intervals overlap. Over time, the first birth 
probability in the second and third quintile increases markedly relative to that in the lowest 
quintile. Thus, the negative coefficients for the second earnings quintile estimated in Model 
1a (Table 2) are driven by the low first birth probability in the second earnings quintile in the 
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first part of the period. At the end of the period, the relationship between earnings and fertility 
is monotonously positive for women as well as men, and the coefficients are of similar 
magnitude across sex. 
 
Figure 2B: Results from hazard regression of earnings quintile on yearly first birth 
probability. Separate models by period, women. Average marginal effects  
 
Note: For each year, the study sample consists of men born between 1955-1988 and aged 20-50 years, who are childless at 
the start of the year. All models include controls for educational attainment and enrolment, reception of unemployment bene-
fits in the previous year, reception of health benefits in the previous year, and dummies for region of births. All explanatory 
variables are lagged with one year.  
 
In the period of study, fathers have become increasingly involved in childrearing, and mothers 
have increased their efforts in paid work. Though these changes could be expected to lead to 
both a less positive earnings-fertility correlation for men and a more positive earnings-fertility 
relationship for women, the empirical results confirm the latter expectation only.  
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5.3 Specification checks 
In the main specification, the earnings variable is lagged by one year. Since the dependent 
variable is live births, most conceptions will take place the year before – i.e. in the year the 
earnings variable is measured. To the extent that being pregnant – or knowing that a child will 
soon be born – affects efforts in the labour market, the earnings variable should be lagged by 
two years rather than one to avoid reverse causality. To check whether the choice of number 
of lags affect the results, I estimate the year-specific models with a two-year lag on the 
earnings variable. The results (Appendix Figure A1) are very similar to those obtained with a 
one-year lag. I therefore conclude that (this form of) reverse causality seemingly does not 
affect the results.  
 
As suggested by Kornstad and Rønsen (2014), the impact of earnings may vary substantially 
by age, violating the proportional hazards assumption. In presence of such varying effects, the 
earnings estimates will give a weighted average of the (differential) effects over age. I test the 
proportionally assumption by running Model 1a separately for six age groups. Results are 
shown in Appendix Figure A2.  Though estimates are positive for all age groups, there is 
statistically significant and substantial difference in the magnitude of the estimates by age.  
The impact of earnings by age shows a clear curvilinear pattern, with estimates close to (and 
not always statistically significant from) zero at low and high ages, and the strongest impact 
in the age group 30-34. The main findings in this paper are thus driven by the relatively strong 
correlation between annual earnings and fertility in the main childbearing years.  
5.4 Study limitations  
I have chosen to use actual (rather than predicted) earnings as a measure for earnings 
potential. This measure underestimates the price of time for individuals who work less than 
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full time. As women are more likely than men to work part time, this underestimation of the 
price of time may be more severe in the female sample than in the male. It should further be 
noted that the estimates do not have a causal interpretation, as unobservable characteristics 
may affect both earnings and fertility. However, the estimated coefficients give an unbiased 
estimate of the (conditional) correlation between annual earnings and first birth probability. 
Studying changes in this correlation over time and across sex casts light on how the 
interlinkages between earned income and fertility behaviour depend on context.  
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study has assessed how the relationship between annual earnings and yearly first birth 
probability changes when mothers increase their effort in paid work and fathers increase their 
efforts in childrearing. The results show that while the positive correlation between annual 
earnings and first birth probability strengthens over time for women, it remains stable over 
time for men. The results for women corroborates the findings from cross country 
comparisons, showing that the correlation between earnings and fertility is more positive for 
women in contexts where motherhood is compatible with pursuing a career (Berninger 2013, 
Andersson et al 2009, see also Matysiak 2011). No previous study has addressed how context 
shapes the relationship between earnings and first birth probability for men. The current study 
indicates that while the relationship between earnings and fertility is shaped by context among 
women, this is not – or at least to a lesser extent – the case among men.  
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The positive correlation between earnings and fertility estimated in Model 1 could indicate 
that the income effect dominates the substitution effect – either because individuals with 
higher earnings overall are more likely to ever have a child (as suggested by the theory of 
fertility quantum (Becker 1991)), and/or because couples may prefer to have a child at a time 
point when earnings are high (as suggested by theories of fertility timing, see e.g. Happel et al 
1984).  However, a positive correlation could also emerge if individuals prefer to enter 
parenthood when a certain level of career maturity is reached, given that high earnings 
(conditional on age and educational level) signalize career maturity. The finding of a positive 
correlation between earnings and first birth probability at all ages (Section 5.3) supports the 
interpretation that at any given age, relatively high earnings (conditional on age and 
education) signalizes career maturity, and thus facilitates the transition to parenthood. The 
interpretation of career maturity as a prerequisite to entering parenthood bears clear 
resemblance to Matysiak’s (2011) finding that Polish women prefer to establish a foothold in 
the labor market before they have a first child.  
 
The estimated positive correlation neither supports the notion that men with low earnings 
throughout the life course are less likely to have a child, nor that women prefer to have a child 
at a time in their career when earnings are low. In Section 2.1, I also suggested that a negative 
correlation would emerge if individuals on high earning trajectories were more likely to 
postpone childbearing than individual on low earning trajectories (heterogeneous 
postponement). Though it cannot be ruled out that such patterns of heterogeneous 
postponement exist, their impact (if any) on the correlation between earnings and fertility is 
cancelled out by mechanisms pulling in the opposite direction. Furthermore, heterogenous 
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postponement would be expected to lead to a negative relationship between earnings and first 
birth probatility at low ages, for which there is no evidence in data.  
 
Turning to change over time, the increasingly positive correlation between earnings and 
fertility for women over time is as expected. As outlined in Section 3, particularly the 
increased availability of public child care has made it easier to combine childrearing with full 
time employment for women – a development expected to weaken the substitution effect and 
make the correlation between female earnings and fertility more positive. Furthermore, if an 
increasing proportion of women intend to work full time also as mothers, fertility timing may 
be increasingly important in order to minimize the long-term negative effects of childbearing 
on earnings and career development. As outlined in Section 2.1, empirical evidence indicates 
that the wage penalty of childbearing is reduced when childbearing is postponed until 
earnings are relatively high, contributing to a positive correlation between earnings and first 
birth probability. Finally, the increasing monetary cost of childbearing may have contributed 
to the more positive correlation observed in the female sample – both through making women 
with relatively high earnings more attractive as partners and by making couples increasingly 
interested in  having a first child at a point in time when her earnings are relatively high. 
 
In light of the substantial changes that have taken place in fathering practices, the stable 
correlation between earnings and the probability to enter parenthood is noteworthy. Based on 
the mechanisms outlined in Section 2.1, more involved fathering could have made the 
correlation between earnings and fertility less positive both if some fathers choose to forgo 
fatherhood due to the increased opportunity costs, and/or if men increasingly prefer to have 
children when earnings are low to minimize the (immediate) forgone earnings associated with 
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childbearing. The observed stable correlation over time indicates that neither of these 
mechanisms dominates. It seems plausible that the relatively small wage penalties observed 
for men do not have profound impact on men’s decision of whether – and if so, when – to 
enter parenthood. The notion that concerns of wage penalties are not crucial for men’s fertility 
decisions is further supported by qualitative evidence showing that even men who intend to 
devote a large amount of time to childrearing rarely consider this to be in conflict with their 
future career development (Ellingsæter & Pedersen 2013). It should be noted, however, that 
the increased monetary costs of childrearing was expected to make the correlation between 
men’s earnings and the transition to parenthood increasingly positive. The possibility that 
mechanisms are at work in opposite directions and cancel each other out can of course not be 
excluded.  
 
Studies of women’s earnings and fertility have found that a positive correlation emerges when 
it is possible to combine paid work with childrearing. The unchanged correlation between 
earnings and male fertility indicates that involved fathering offers men the opportunity to 
combine active childrearing with employment – seemingly without introducing a conflict 
between employment and fathering. As fathers increasingly partake in childrearing, it may be 
increasingly important for men to enter parenthood at the time in their career when 
childrearing has the least negative impact on long-term earnings. To the extent that the wage 
penalty is inversely related to earnings at the time of entry into parenthood, such strategic 
timing can contribute to a more positive correlation between annual earnings and first birth 
probability.   
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The positive correlation between earnings and fertility observed in Norway therefore need not 
be driven solely by an income effect as such, but could also reflect preferences for ordering of 
life course transitions:  Establishing a solid foothold in the labour market before a first child is 
born may (be perceived to) ease the subsequent combination of career development and 
childrearing. If the estimated coefficients were to be driven by an income effect only, a shift 
from the lowest to the highest income quintile would increase the yearly odds of a first birth 
with more 84% for women and 144% for men
10
. In a context where a large proportion of the 
monetary cost of childbearing is covered by the welfare state, income effects of this 
magnitude may come across as surprisingly large.   
 
Interestingly, the two suspected main drivers of a positive correlation between earnings and 
fertility – the income effect and the preference for career maturity – may also reinforce each 
other. If some couples – motivated by career planning concerns – prefer to have a child when 
earnings are relatively high, the purchasing power among parents will (as a possibly 
unintended consequence) increase. Increased wealth among parents may heighten the 
standards for consumption on children, in turn leading other couples – initially less concerned 
with career positioning – to prefer to have children at a time point when earnings are high. 
This example of self-reinforcing mechanisms underlines the complex nature of the causal 
drivers of the correlation between earnings and fertility. For a better understanding of this 
relationship, studies that address the relationship between earnings profiles over the life 
course and fertility timing decisions are clearly called for.  
 
                                                 
10 Calculated based on odds ratios for Model 1 a and b (full results shown as AME in Table 2).  
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Appendix  
 
 
Figure A1: Results from hazard regressions of earnings quintile (two years lag) on yearly first 
birth probability. Separate models by period, men and women. Average marginal effects  
 
 
Note: For each year, the study sample consists of women born between 1955-1988 and aged 20-50 years, who are childless 
at the start of the year. All models include controls for educational attainment and enrolment, reception of unemployment 
benefits in the previous year, reception of health benefits in the previous year, and dummies for region of births. With the 
exception of earnings quintile (lagged with two years), all explanatory variables are lagged with one year. 
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Figure A2: Hazard regressions of earnings quintile on yearly first birth probability. Separate 
models by 5-year age groups. men and women. Average marginal effects  
 
Note:  The study sample consists of men and women born between 1955-1988, who were childless and above age 20 for at 
least one year in the period 1994-2008. The sample is split into six subsamples each covering a five year age bracket (six 
years for the the interval 45-50). All models include controls for educational attainment and enrolment, reception of unem-
ployment benefits in the previous year, reception of health benefits in the previous year, and dummies for region of birth and 
calendar year (4 year brackets). All explanatory variables are lagged with one year. 
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Table A1:  Frequency distribution of zero, non-zero and missing earnings by year and sex. 
Percentages in brackets.  
 
 
 MEN  WOMEN  
Period Nonzero Zero Missing Total Nonzero Zero Missing Total 
1994 314170 37289 59548 411007 223540 20471 58683 302694 
 [76,44] [9,07] [14,49] [100,00] [73,85] [6,76] [19,39] [100,00] 
1995 324504 34146 58499 417149 229787 20222 57345 307354 
 [77,79] [8,19] [14,02] [100,00] [74,76] [6,58] [18,66] [100,00] 
1996 332642 31657 57380 421679 234546 19790 56023 310359 
 [78,89] [7,51] [13,61] [100,00] [75,57] [6,38] [18,05] [100,00] 
1997 336726 31504 56234 424464 236659 20522 54895 312076 
 [79,33] [7,42] [13,25] [100,00] [75,83] [6,58] [17,59] [100,00] 
1998 343322 28758 56037 428117 240409 19624 54564 314597 
 [80,19] [6,72] [13,09] [100,00] [76,42] [6,24] [17,34] [100,00] 
1999 349951 27521 54681 432153 244931 19035 53585 317551 
 [80,98] [6,37] [12,65] [100,00] [77,13] [5,99] [16,87] [100,00] 
2000 353664 28069 53897 435630 247893 19307 52608 319808 
 [81,18] [6,44] [12,37] [100,00] [77,51] [6,04] [16,45] [100,00] 
2001 356513 28421 53552 438486 250634 19247 52387 322268 
 [81,31] [6,48] [12,21] [100,00] [77,77] [5,97] [16,26] [100,00] 
2002 359380 30229 53304 442913 253672 20394 51281 325347 
 [81,14] [6,83] [12,03] [100,00] [77,97] [6,27] [15,76] [100,00] 
2003 361284 34078 51841 447203 256563 22365 49308 328236 
 [80,79] [7,62] [11,59] [100,00] [78,16] [6,81] [15,02] [100,00] 
2004 358297 38073 54574 450944 255614 23151 52222 330987 
 [79,45] [8,44] [12,10] [100,00] [77,23] [6,99] [15,78] [100,00] 
2005 358845 41472 54688 455005 256517 25224 51963 333704 
 [78,87] [9,11] [12,02] [100,00] [76,87] [7,56] [15,57] [100,00] 
2006 357916 42319 53553 453788 256328 25906 50436 332670 
 [78,87] [9,33] [11,80] [100,00] [77,05] [7,79] [15,16] [100,00] 
2007 360593 39674 51974 452241 257697 24733 49656 332086 
 [79,73] [8,77] [11,49] [100,00] [77,60] [7,45] [14,95] [100,00] 
2008 364535 36660 51834 453029 260756 23188 49225 333169 
 [80,47] [8,09] [11,44] [100,00] [78,27] [6,96] [14,77] [100,00] 
Total 5232342 509870 821596 6563808 3705546 323179 794181 4822906 
 [79,72] [7,77] [12,52] [100,00] [76,83] [6,70] [16,47] [100,00] 
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